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“Sua cuique persona?” A Note on the Fiction
of Legal Personhood and a Reﬂection on
Interdisciplinary Consequences
Jeanne Gaakeer
Abstract, The image of the mask is a well-known metaphor in law. It exem-
pliﬁes the legal persona in that it both hides the private sphere and at the
same time it enables participation in the public sphere by means of the legal
personality of the rights-and-duties-bearing person that can effectuate legal
standing. But legal personhood is itself a ﬁction, because it is a construction of
law without which human beings would “merely” be individual persons. This
ﬁction is most explicit in the artiﬁcial personality of corporations. Historically,
the attribution of personhood by law shows that issues surrounding person-
hood, identity, and, or in relation to, the body often lead to normative and phil-
osophical contestations. These are important to note in view of disciplinary
cooperations of the “Law and” kind on the view that conceptual differences in
cooperating ﬁelds lead to new Babels rather than interdisciplinary successes.
Keywords, legal personhood,
legal ﬁction, free will, determin-
ism, identity
INTRODUCTION
Some years ago when I visited the Pallazo degli Uffizi in Florence, I saw a portrait of
a veiled woman by Ridolfo del Ghirlandaio (painted c.1510), with an accompanying
panel to cover it. The panel shows a mask with the caption “sua cuique persona,”
i.e., to each his own mask (Figure 1).1 This enigmatic text prompts the subject of my
article. What does “To each his own mask” mean? Whose mask? Which mask? Or
should we say “to each his own identity?”
In law, the metaphor of the mask is well known. Exemplifying the legal persona,
themask hides ourmost private, individual sphere of life and, at the same time, it ena-
bles us to participate in the public sphere by giving us a legal personality, i.e., by mak-
ing us a rights-and-duties-bearing person who can effectuate his or her legal standing.
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But legal personhood, while bestowed on the human person at birth in the West-
ern legal systems as we know them, is itself a fiction precisely because it is a crea-
tion, i.e., a construction of law without which we would “merely” be individuals, or
even “unpersons” in the Orwellian sense, thought to have never existed in terms of
the law and obviously without anything resembling a human right.2 Such individu-
als would be treated as objects, as was the case with slaves, women,3 and children
in ancient Greece and Rome and even in less ancient times in Western civilization,
and as still is the case with animals. In worst-case scenarios, given such lack of for-
mal recognition by law, they could be randomly disposed of, a fate unfortunately
shared by those whose formal personhood is simply denied or taken away, as hap-
pened, for example, in Nazi Germany.
This fiction of law is most explicit in the artificial personality of corporations,
from the medieval concept of the universitas to Citizens United v. FEC 130 S. Ct.
876, 900, 913 (2010), a US constitutional case in which the US Supreme Court held
that the prohibition imposed on the basis of the BCRA (Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002) on Citizens United (a nonprofit corporation) to broadcast a film
that was highly critical of Hilary Clinton within 30 days of the 2008 primaries was
a violation of the First Amendment. To me, the very idea of personhood being
assigned to selected “bodies” also draws attention to the liminality of personhood,
i.e., to questions concerning the boundaries of what a human being as a person is
(and/or the other way around). I will first outline, however briefly, the legal history
Figure 1. Ridolfo del Ghirlandaio, Portrait of a Veiled Woman, c.1510. Pallazo degli Ufﬁzi, Florence.
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of the attribution of personhood, highlighting what I suggest remain challenges in
our present age in which biotechnological and digital developments seriously ques-
tion the traditional views on personhood and identity (both in the normative and
philosophical senses). In addition, I address some of the issues found to the level of
our disciplinary cooperations for purposes of our better understanding of the new
challenges on the meta-level of interdisciplinarity, on the view that when fields of
knowledge began to diverge in the course of the 18th and 19th centuries and aca-
demic disciplines were formed, a divergence on the plane of concepts took place that
causes problems of translation between disciplines in contemporary cooperations.
By way of tentative conclusion, I discuss the idea of narrated life as a way out of per-
ceived deadlocks pertaining to an exclusively formal-legal view on personhood.
PART I
Legal Personhood: Origins
Point of departure for the historical overview is Roman law, because the codification
of Roman law between the second and sixth centuries CE, ordered by the Byzantine
Emperor Justinian (527–65 CE), hence its name, Codex Justinianus, formed the
basis for the development of law in Western Europe once it was rediscovered in
Bologna in the 11th century. Roman law’s main building blocks were legal person-
hood, family, property, treaty and tort, with an emphasis on the former. The Corpus
Iuris Civilis as it was called, a combination of the Codex, the Digests (codified
Roman case law) and the Institutes (educational texts), brought us the tripartite
division of the books of private law (civilis for civil or private law as distinguished
from canonical laws of the Christian Church) in personae, res, actiones.4 The divi-
sion kept its prominence until today. William Blackstone incorporated it in his Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England that was adapted in the British colonies (together
with Edward Coke’s Institutes) and helped form the basis for American law. Ameri-
can legal formalism as developed by Christopher Langdell in the 19th century, for
example, builds on the distinction between actio in rem and actio in personam.
John Chipman Gray, unintendedly perhaps, pointed to the contested area of the
use of the term person when he wrote,
In books of the Law, as in other books, and in common speech [added
emphasis], “person” is often used as meaning a human being, but
the technical legal meaning of a “person” is a subject of legal rights
and duties.5
In Germany, the jurist Von Savigny (1779–1861) used the Digests (or Pandectae,
hence the name of the movement, Pandektenwissenschaft) to build a closed system
of legal concepts. The Napoleonic Code Civil (1804) became the basis for Dutch civil
law, the first books of which reflect the original division: persons, both natural and
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artificial, their goods, and their dealings with them. Roman law, in short, is a factor
still to be reckoned with in the cultural landscape of law, whether we like it or not.
The historical root of persona as legal personhood is succinctly brought to our
attention by Hannah Arendt (1906–75) in On Revolution:
In its original meaning it signified the mask ancient actors used to
wear in a play. (The dramatis personae corresponded to the Greek
ta ton dramatoB prosώpa.) The mask as such obviously has two
functions: it had to hide, or rather to replace, the actor’s own face
and countenance, but in a way that would make it possible for the
voice to sound through. At any rate, it was in this twofold under-
standing of a mask through which a voice sounds that the word per-
sona became a metaphor and was carried from the language of the
theatre into legal terminology. The distinction between a private
individual in Rome and a Roman citizen was that the latter had a
persona, a legal personality, as we would say; it was as though the
law had affixed to him the part he was expected to play on the public
scene, with the provision, however, that his own voice would be able
to sound through. The point was that “it is not the natural Ego
which enters a court of law. It is a right-and-duty-bearing person,
created by the law, which appears before the law.” Without his per-
sona, there would be an individual without rights and duties, per-
haps a “natural man” – that is, a human being or homo in the
original meaning of the word, indicating someone outside the range
of the law and the body politic of the citizens, as for instance a slave
– but certainly a politically irrelevant being.
[…]
Although the etymological root of persona seems to derive from per-
zonare, from the Greek tzώnh, and hence to mean originally
“disguise”, one is tempted to believe that the word carried for Latin
ears the significance of per-sonare, “to sound through”, whereby in
Rome the voice that sounded through the mask was certainly the
voice of the ancestors rather than the voice of the individual actor.6
Two aspects are important to note here. First, the movement of the term persona
from its original environment, the theatre, to a new place in law and politics, a
movement from literal meaning to metaphoric usage denoting man’s social role(s).
And following this, secondly, the idea of having roles assigned, i.e., rather than
taken on.7 Since these roles were both social and legal, the connection of law and
morality is notable. Young children, women and slaves were not regarded as
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personae, their status was that of a minor under the guardianship of the pater fami-
lias who had complete authority, the so-called patria potestas, over them. Being
and having a persona, decided on the basis of “the capacity to enter into obligations
in such a way that one could be held legally responsible for fulfilling those
obligations,”8 meant status and privilege in a political sense, minors not being part
of the political order. From a moral point of view, the role-aspect was highlighted by
Cicero who emphasized that
We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two char-
acters (i.e. personae in the original), as it were; one of these is uni-
versal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with
reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute.
From this all morality and propriety are derived, and upon this
depends the rational method of ascertaining our duty. The other
character is the one that is assigned to individuals in particular.9
As far as the former persona is concerned, the distinction between humans and
non-human beings that has proved to be detrimental to innovation of legal person-
hood in our present age is prominent. The latter persona refers to both social and
legal roles that may or may not overlap, each with their corresponding duties. To
this Cicero adds a third distinction in that the human and his roles are both deter-
mined by chance and circumstances, for example, when one is born a male in a noble
family, and by choice, in the sense that by executing our free will we decide on, for
example, a specific profession or a goal in life.10
When in the Middle Ages the Christian Church became a source of law by means
of its canonical laws, Roman morality was exchanged for doctrines of the soul and
immortality. That not only opened up the possibility of inclusion of those formerly
excluded on a legal basis – since everybody has a soul – but also the use and mean-
ing of the term persona expanded, not least given the influence of Quintilian’s Insti-
tutiones on the topic of rhetoric and the writings of the Church Fathers, such as
Augustine of Hippo, and Doctors of the Church, such as Saint Thomas Aquinas
whose Aristotelian focus on ratio and substance or matter shows in his definition
vera persona est rei rationabilis individua substantia.11 The attention to the per-
sona as physical body was pushed to the background to the benefit of the develop-
ment of the person as the conflation of the soul and the individual.
This discursive expansion coincided with the institution of universities where
the scholastic deductive method of textual exegesis and systematization of knowl-
edge, in law and other fields we now call academic disciplines, took place. And it is
precisely the university that benefitted from the development of the concept of per-
sonhood. Originally the term for a corporate body12 such as an ecclesiastical colle-
gium (most medieval corporate bodies had a religious of charitative purpose), the
universitas could not be excommunicated or be found guilty of a civil or criminal
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offence and subsequently punished, on the view that the universitas did not have a
corporal body and neither did it have a soul or a free will, being only a legal name,
nomina sunt juris et non personarum.13 This doctrine helped Pope Innocent IV
(1243–54) who also claimed “cum collegium in causa universitatis fingatur una per-
sona,”14 maintain the supremacy of the spiritual over secular power.
This bulwark theory, however, was soon demolished. In 1155, Emperor Freder-
ick Barbarossa awarded the schools in Bologna that were devoted to the study of
law a special status. These schools were private schools, small societates, each
grouped around a magister. Students of different schools began to unite depending
on their geographical roots, i.e., citramontanas and ultramontanas, that is, from
the Italian side of or from beyond the Alps. Thus two universitates were formed.
The students demanded an oath of allegiance from their magistri, organized their
relations with the local population, and decided about the jurisdiction for their own
internal affairs. Initially, the local authorities tried to prevent this development.
When the pope began to support the students, partly for his own profit by introduc-
ing the licentia docendi to keep control of those teaching, local authorities in 1270
recognized the universitas as a separate entity, an autonomous corporation with
specific privileges for the students such as tax exemption. In short, as alliances of
students in Bologna formed a universitas studiosorum, its corporate personality
offered protection against both secular and clerical intrusions.15 Its curriculum cov-
ered the whole range of subjects important for a broad education in which bound-
aries between disciplines were more permeable than in contemporary academia.16
The development of the corporation and with it the concept of legal personhood
accelerated with the growth of commerce throughout Europe, as kings and emper-
ors granted charters. From then on, corporations other than church institutions
could also hold property, enter into contracts in their own name, govern themselves
by boards, and, if necessary, sue and be sued. From the 17th century onward, the
corporation became the legal figure for trading companies such as the Dutch East
India Company. Chartered companies began to control international trade. In the
United States they also became popular for public projects such as canals and
bridges, a topic to which I turn below.17 The popularity of artificial personhood for
practical, commercial reasons is obvious: unlike the human body of the natural per-
son as a legal person, the artificial person does not die, universitas non moritur, as
Ernst Kantorowicz explains in his seminal study The King’s Two Bodies.18 The
“artificial reason of law,” then, as sir Edward Coke coined it in the early 17th cen-
tury, produced fictions both to preserve the autonomy of law against the (will of the)
absolute sovereign, and to have these fictions reconstruct what is external to law (i.
e., as an autonomous discipline) in a conceptual manner to get a grip on the society
that law is supposed to order and fulfill its task of ordo ordinans, the ordering
order.19
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Legal Personhood: Developments
The theatrical aspect of the persona did not wholly disappear, although it went
under the practical legal surface. As Jay Watson points out, in the morality plays of
the medieval era the human participants only had allegorical significance, “as
opposed to the richer symbolic significance of the persona juris,”20 i.e., of the later
Elizabethan era. As far as the latter is concerned, Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor
Faustus is the first case in point, featuring the contract as the legal figure per se.
The idea of role-playing returns with a vengeance in the lemma persona in the law
dictionary conceived by the Dutch philosopher Adriaan Koerbagh which contains
the definition: “persona, een mensch, ’t sy man of vrouw; een toneel-speelder, mom-
aangesigt.”21 What is more, the persona as momus is also the mask behind which
those who criticize society can hide or retreat from the authorities, both in the legal
and the literary senses of the guarantee of anonymity, as often happened in the
pamphlet culture in 17th-century Dutch society.22 To William Shakespeare goes
the credit for making the final step toward the truly personal identity of his charac-
ters, i.e., an identity other than the group identity that prevailed in the Middle
Ages, with their self-knowledge centre stage.23
The new understanding of the person as an individual permeates the legal theo-
ries of the 17th century. With it, in many senses, the main topic of modernity
becomes “the riddle of identity.”24 The convenient idea of a person as one bestowed
with a soul and rationality that was predominant as long as the Christian Church’s
doctrine prevailed, was exchanged for the forensic concept of the persona. The legal
figure of the contract became its main representation, as, in the terminology later
coined by Henry Maine in the new discipline of anthropology, the development from
status to contract was brought to conclusion.25 The social contract theories of Hugo
Grotius (with his emphasis on the appetitus societatis), Thomas Hobbes, and John
Locke are obvious examples. To Hobbes, the individual is the building block of soci-
ety as can also be seen from the frontispiece of Leviathan. What is more, as Hobbes
explains in chapter 16 entitled “Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated,” the
individual owns his words and actions and via this concept of ownership he may
enter into a contract with others. To Hobbes, in short, everything can be seen in
terms of contractual relations:
A Person is he whose words or actions are considered, either as his
own or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of
any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by
Fiction.
When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall
Person: And, when they are considered as representing the words
and actions of an other, then is he a Feigned or Artificial person.
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The word person is latine; instead whereof the Greeks have
prόsvon, which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the
disguise or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the
Stage, and sometimes more particularly that part of it, which dis-
guiseth the face, as a Mask or Vizard: And from the Stage, hath
been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in
Tribunalls as Theaters. So that a Person, is the same that an Actor
is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to Personate
is to Act, or Represent himselfe or an other; and he that acteth
another is said to beare his Person, or act in his name […]
Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned by
those whom they represent. And then the Person is the Actor; and
he that owneth his words and actions is the Author, in which case
the Actor acteth by authority. For that which in speaking of goods
and possessions is called an Owner and in latine dominus, in Greek
kύrio&; speaking of Actions is called Author. And as the Right of pos-
session is called Dominion; so the Right of doing any action is called
Authority. So that by Authority, is alwayes understood a Right of
doing any act, and done by Authority, done by Commission, or
License from him whose right it is.26
The legal view on (artificial) personhood was also much influenced by the idea of
man as a machine. This can be traced back philosophically to Descartes’ Traite de
l’homme (1648), a treatise on the subject of the mechanical model of man, and a
thought experiment on artificial man, on the basis of the Cartesian distinction
between res cogitans (that part of the human which thinks) and res extensa (the
human’s body),27 with dire consequences not only for the human being but also
more specifically for animals.28 To Locke, then, goes the credit for taking the debate
a step further. While he still thought of the person in terms of a forensic concept,29
the essential attributes of a person in the sense of identity according to Locke are
self-consciousness and memory. This brings him to a definition of the person as, “a
thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as
itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places,” i.e., “person” is
equated with “self,” and this leads Locke to the claim that “[E]very man has a prop-
erty in his own person. […] The labour of his body and the work of his hands we
may say are properly his.”30 So here too the notion of property rights as applied to
one’s body results in the freedom of contract as the power to undertake obliga-
tions.31 Later on, Immanuel Kant defines a person as “the subject whose actions are
susceptible to imputation. Accordingly, moral personality is nothing but the free-
dom of a rational being under moral laws,” and Kant also claims that “Rationality is
a necessary condition for morality. Moral respect is due that without which there
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could not be any moral respect. Therefore, rational beings must be respected.”32
What is important to note is that to Kant all rational beings, i.e., not just humans,
can be persons. Nevertheless, the Enlightenment conception of a person in the form
of entitlement to (fundamental) rights and as the bearer of duties is the outcome of
a long process of legal evolution, while the moral and metaphysical idea of rights as
innate to human beings connected to it remains problematic when the status of bor-
derline human beings is to be concerned, for the very simple reason that we lack a
(legal) definition of the human being agreed upon by all. This is especially problem-
atic when it comes to the construction of “creatures” by means of new technologies.
Theories of Incorporation
The development of the corporation as discussed above occasioned a diversity of the-
ories, culminating in the 19th and early 20th centuries, with respect to the nature
and form of the artificial person and its relation to the natural person. They were
geared toward legal practice. Given the overarching conference theme, my focus is
on those aspects that return with a vengeance in contemporary interdisciplinary
discussions of personhood and identity, and I will discuss some exemplary cases.
The crucial point with respect to assigning legal personhood is that the human
being is not a person before the law because he is a human being, but because the
law calls him or her “person.” The legal subject is a construction to serve human
beings in their activities, especially in relation to others. “Put roughly,” as John
Dewey wrote, “‘person’ signifies what law makes it signify,” and this leads Dewey to
the conclusion that “for the purposes of law the conception of ‘person’ is a legal con-
ception.”33 The circularity of the argument is obvious, and quite rightly Dewey
urges us, although unfortunately in a footnote, not to confound personality with
capacity, i.e., say that all legal personality is equally real because the law gives it
existence and equally fictitious because it is only the law which gives it existence.
In other words, artificial is not synonymous with fictitious. That which is artificial
is real and not imaginary, e.g., “an artificial lake is not an imaginary lake,” because
artificial as a juridical term contains the root fiction derived from the Latin verb fin-
gere, to make, i.e., not to feign.34 To paraphrase Marianne Moore, the gardens may
be imaginary but the toads are real, and, one may add, with tooth and claw, espe-
cially in today’s corporate law.
In due course, then, the fiction theory or artificial person theory based on the
view that an artificial person such as a corporation is “not really” a person but pre-
cisely what it says: artificial, i.e., an artificial being “existing only in contemplation
of law,” was replaced by more realistic views on how collectivities can participate as
subjects before the law.35 Dewey should to my mind especially be credited for his
aim to seek non-legal factors which have found their way into the discussion of per-
sonality of both natural and artificial persons because this makes his work an inter-
esting stepping-stone for interdisciplinary purposes, not least because he draws the
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attention to the all too often unconsciously accepted (Kantian) postulate that before
anything can be a legal person “it must intrinsically posses certain properties, the
existence of which is necessary to constitute anything a person.”36
As Kantian German legal theory would have it, to be a subject is the precondi-
tion for being a rights-and-duties-bearing agent. This has led to confusion, for exam-
ple, in comparative law because the figure of the trust in common law has no
counterpart in the civil law tradition, and to conflict when it comes to assigning
legal personhood to new entities other than the natural human being or the collec-
tivity. And one look at Wikipedia entries on the topic suffices to see how persistent
the problem is.37 Such seeming contradiction can be solved only by thinking in
terms of the conflation of the subject and his attributes, or rather, as Kevin Crotty
writes, “In effect, there is no such thing as a ‘pre-legal’ person who then decides to
establish law, just as there is no such thing (for example) as a ‘pre-linguistic’ person
who consciously decides to speak.”38 Dewey distinguishes between thinking in
terms of essential nature of things or in terms of their consequences (as pragmatists
who focus on “what a thing does” prefer). In the latter case, “the right-and-duty
bearing unit, or subject, signifies whatever has consequences of a specified kind,”39
and consequences are to be ascertained on the basis of facts. This consequential rea-
soning obviously works better when we deal with human rights issues such as the
premise of the inviolability of human dignity, questions concerning the attribution
of personhood to, for example, trees as Christopher Stone would have it, animals, or
human clones, or in cases with respect to the inviolable rights of corporations, as in
Citizens Unitedmentioned above.
Interlude: Practical Consequences
Practical consequences, also as far as the internal differentiation of law of private
and public law in the United States is concerned that occurred as a result of the
growing demand for specialized legal knowledge during and following the Indus-
trial Revolution and the transformative era of technological progress in the 19th
century, can be illustrated by a comparison of two cases about the dogmatic place of
the corporation: is that in the field of private law or in public law? The first is the
Dartmouth College case (1818). The American laws of property were inspired by
Locke. The dominant idea was that the first possessor gains a right of ownership by
his physical and financial effort to cultivate the soil, to create things out of available
materials, and so forth. Dartmouth College, then, was established in 1769, i.e.,
before American independence, by Eleazar Wheelock together with 11 other men.
They did so on the basis of a government charter that made them a corporation, the
Trustees of Dartmouth College. This charter gave the founder the right to appoint
the next president of the college, but it was stipulated that Wheelock could not do so
other than in compliance with the trustees. Wheelock was then succeeded by his
son, John, but the trustees removed him given huge differences of opinion. The New
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Hampshire legislator then changed the original charter so that another institute of
higher education could be founded, Dartmouth University presided by John Wheel-
ock. The trustees took their case to court because of this violation of the original
relation between trustees and the government. The questio iuris was: “Is Dart-
mouth College a private corporation with certain privileges and immunities for its
trustees or a public corporation subject to the modifications of state legislature?” In
other words, can a public body such as the New Hampshire legislator unilaterally
change a charter? The Supreme Court decided that a state legislator could not inter-
fere with the contractual relation that is the basis of any charter. In the words of
Chief Justice John Marshall:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and exist-
ing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation con-
fers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence
[…] that this is a contract, the obligation of which cannot be
impaired, without violating the constitution of the United States.
[…] The founders of the college contracted, not merely for the per-
petual application of the funds which they gave, to the objects for
which those funds were given; they contracted also, to secure that
application by the constitution of the corporation’40
Thus, the contractual aspect of the charter prevailed, and the original right of
the contractors remained intact. The Lockean concept of property changed, how-
ever, in the course of the 19th century.
The case illustrating this development is Charles River Bridge Company v. War-
ren Bridge Company, 11 Pet. (36 U.S.) 420 (1837),41 a conflict between two corpora-
tions each with a charter to develop a toll bridge. The charter of the Charles River
Bridge Company was granted first and since the trustees feared that the second
charter of the Warren Bridge Company would have negative economic consequen-
ces for them, they challenged the second charter on the ground that it violated their
own vested rights, i.e., their exclusive contract with the government. Here the ques-
tio iuris was whether or not the state could infringe the vested rights of one corpora-
tion by granting a charter to another corporation. The court allowed it and in this
way economic development by means of entrepreneurial competition became possi-
ble. A parallel development of private law and public law was the result. The doc-
trine developed in the Dartmouth College case governed the private–public law
distinction, and, paradoxically perhaps, it also protected private interests of the
kind protected by the Bridge case that showed an instrumental view on private
law.42
But contract and the body, either of the natural person or the corporation, were
no quiet spots as the (in)famous Lochner case (Lochner v. New York (198 U.S. 45
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(1905)) shows. A New York labor law of 1897 restricted the maximum work hours in
bakeries to 60 hours per week, but the Supreme Court deemed such legislation an
infringement of the freedom of contract as protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, i.e., the Lockean rights to life, liberty, and property.43
However, in stark contrast with, but with explicit reference to, the Lochner deci-
sion isMuller v. Oregon (208 U.S. 412 (1908)) on the limitation of female employees’
working hours to 10 per day on the paternalistic ground that women are by defini-
tion different from men and therefore they need protection more than freedom of
contract. That is to say, the risk that women do not know what is good for them is
too big and so a labor law may set aside their freedom to accept longer working
days. Here, while acknowledging that women have equal contractual and personal
rights with men, the Lockean idea that “every man has a property in his own per-
son” is discarded, with an argument that has an unpleasant eugenic foreboding,
That woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence
is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood
are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of
the medical fraternity continuance for a long time on her feet at
work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurous effects upon
the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigourous off-
spring, the physical wellbeing of woman becomes an object of public
interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the
race. Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has always
been dependent upon man. […] Differentiated by these matters
from the other sex, she is properly placed in a class by herself, and
legislation designed for her protection may be sustained, even when
like legislation is not necessary for men and could not be
sustained.44
Ironically, this goes to show that attention to female bodily characteristics intro-
duced inequality as far as the idea of legal personhood as originally connected to the
figure of the contract is concerned, and all for the benefit of women.45
The devastating consequences of a language of concepts can be seen in cases
with respect to those other human beings who were deemed inferior to “men”:
slaves. Dred Scott v. Sanford (19 How. (60 U.S.) 393, 1857)46 is the landmark case
on the classification of people of color as non-entities in law on the basis of what Jus-
tice Taney defined as the single question in this case:
Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country and
sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed
and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States,
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and as such become entitled to all the rights and privileges, and
immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen? One of
which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States
in the cases specified in the Constitution.
His answer was negative, on the view that when the Constitution was drafted,
its framers intended to exclude the class of people to which Scott belonged as
a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the domi-
nant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their author-
ity, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the
government might grant them.
Taney’s reference to the framers’ intention is an example of a hermeneutics of
exclusion.47 Or, as Rhino has it in Margaret Atwood’s recent novel MaddAddam
(2013), “Who cares what we call them. […] So long as it’s not people.”48 In the 1859
case of the United States v. Amy, a slave-girl against whom a criminal charge was
brought (24 F.Cas. 792), however, the prosecutor said to the judges: “I cannot prove
more plainly that the prisoner is a person, a natural person, at least, than to ask
your honors to look at her. There she is.”49 This statement would seem to recognize
the girl’s humanity and personhood. The prosecutor then ironically argued that
while the girl had no legal standing, she could nevertheless be the subject of a crimi-
nal charge.50
PART II
Flaps and Patches”51
On the basis of the above, I suggest three topics for our ongoing discussion of legal
bodies on the plane of interdisciplinary studies that are important both separately
and in their interconnections, as far research on the history of ideas is concerned
and in view of contemporary technological developments. These are the concept of
the free will as the criterion for assigning legal personhood, the very idea of the
legal fiction as a linguistic issue concerning the conceptual differences between
“artificial” and “imaginary,” and last but not least, the epistemological distinction
between subject and object. The latter topic is obviously closely related to, first, the
distinction between the legal person and the human person as both body and iden-
tity, and, second, on the meta-level, the question after position of disciplines on the
disciplinary spectrum, i.e., firmly rooted in the natural sciences paradigm (in- or
excluding the social sciences), or belonging to the humanities (again, in- or exclud-
ing the social sciences).
To start with the second, what should be kept in mind is that the process of the
differentiation of “knowledge” into separate academic disciplines is a process that
culminated in the late 19th century and the field of law is a prime example in that a
differentiation of law itself took place as economics, sociology, and anthropology left
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the mother discipline.52 Each discipline developed its own professional language
and methodology, and with differences in outlook and differences in objectives, con-
cepts that fields had originally shared, began to diverge.53 With the rise of scientific
positivism, the Cartesian analytical methodology of the Discours de la Methode,
insisting on its own monistic character as does Hobbesian methodological individu-
alism, triumphed. Thus clarity and certainty, ideally at least, collapsed, both as the
general aim of the quest for human knowledge and as the litmus test for ascertain-
ing the scientific underpinnings of any field. In short, the struggle to promote the
methodology and unitary model of knowledge of the natural sciences for all disci-
plines founded in the rationalism and empiricism of the late 16th and 17th centu-
ries came to its logical conclusion.54
The discussion on the free will as criterion for being a person and a legal person
at that is an insightful illustration of this development. It is immediately connected
to concepts such as guilt and culpability, and the position taken on the subject has
consequences for our views on retribution and the forms it should take, e.g., by
incarceration of “the body.” So Dewey was right that the development of concepts
such as intent is illustrative of “the history of religion, morals and psychology,” or
rather, “the intellectual and scientific history of western Europe is reflected in the
changing fortunes of the meanings of ‘person’ and ‘personality’ […].”55
In law, the concept of the free will is the product of a long development. Its foun-
dation is the combined classical-philosophical view of the will as an ability in the
sense of an attribute of the soul, and of religious views ranging from St. Augustine
to John Calvin who as champions of predestination as far as the afterlife is con-
cerned also thought in terms of the free will to do the right and abstain from what is
wrong (both the mala per se (such as murder) and the mala prohibita what law
prohibits).
In the Age of Enlightenment, the topic becomes acute as can be seen from the
entries in the Dictionnaires of the French philosophers Pierre Bayle and Voltaire.
To Bayle, who was based in Rotterdam, the subjective philosophical concept of the
liberum arbitrium indifferentiae is the key: having a free will means that man, for
example, is free to decide to go either left or right, even if there is no specific reason
to do either. In other words, one has freedom to act if one is, simply speaking able to
do whatever one decides.56 As Voltaire put it succinctly in his Dictionnaire philoso-
phique, “Vous e^tes libre de faire, quand vous avez le pouvoir de faire.”57 Freedom of
the will is when one is free in one’s decision to act at all. This is the precursor and
precondition of the freedom to act in that it presupposes the mental ability to decide
whether or not to do this, that or the other.
For lawyers, the interesting question is what it means that a decision is free.
That is to say, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions that enable such a
decision, and what are the consequences. These are obviously essential questions
too when dealing with the topic of the relation between subject and object. From a
philosophical point of view, the Cartesian ontological dualism of mind and matter is
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a necessary presupposition if one wants to assert the working of the free will and
the freedom of human agency as contrasted to an all-encompassing determinism.
Even though Kant had already discussed guilt and punishment in his Metaphysics
of Morals (1797) in the context of what would nowadays be called diminished
responsibility on the basis of a psychiatric diagnosis,58 the view of absolute indeter-
minism with no restrictions on the individual’s free will, i.e., not even by his own
innate characteristics and/or restrictions, bodily and otherwise, remained
dominant.
It was not until the further development of such empirical sciences as craniol-
ogy, physiognomy, and anthropometry59 that it became seriously challenged in the
course of the 19th century. With the rise of the new field of criminal anthropology,
crime came to be viewed as the product of measurable causes that existed (more or
less) independently of a person’s free will. In criminal law, the new direction taken
on this basis was then founded on the argument that punishment must fit the indi-
vidual criminal, and, on the claim that there are criminal types whose behavior is
determined rather than chosen, that treatment rather than punishment may be
appropriate in specific cases.
The conflict between indeterminism and determinism in essence comes down to
this: the indeterminist presupposes volition per se, and reproaches the determinist
for denying the option of attributing the criminal act to the individual. The deter-
minist takes the indeterminist to task for his inability to give reasons for his
actions, i.e., other than “I wanted it because I wanted it.” This is the philosophical
stalemate of the tertium non datur and, with that, the ontological and methodologi-
cal problem of those fields of knowledge that take the human as both subject and
object of inquiry, and with it the debate on their disciplinary positions on either the
explanatory spectrum of the natural sciences or that of the humanities aimed at
understanding, rather than explaining, human actions. It is the root of the “Two
Cultures” argument of the 1960s when C. P. Snow and F. R. Leavis collided on the
topic of the value of the humanities, a fierce argument that contributed to the rise
of interdisciplinary studies in the past four decades and has not diminished since.
The deterministic view as espoused by the modern school of criminal law
thought of human volition as the combined product of both internal causes, such as
the individual’s character, and external causes, such as societal circumstances.
Where the classical school linked volition to powers of reason and judgment, the
deterministic school dealt with questions whether disturbances of the intellectual
powers or a mental disease could provide extenuating factors, both with respect to
punishment and psychiatric treatment of a defendant.60
One Dutch determinist, Hamon, concluded that volition is a metaphysical fad, a
sophism to be denied by criminologists who necessarily have to accept that crimi-
nals could not be held accountable, on the view that positivistic natural sciences
have proved that everything is, in one way or another, “determined.”61 He argued
that the only basis for indeterminism is that man is aware of the fact that he has a
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will, but that is not enough because being conscious of something is not evidence of
its existence. Or rather, consciousness and free will can themselves be the deter-
mined product of the human brain and its workings, because, as Locke had already
argued previously, we do not know the causes that determine our thoughts and
actions. This point was well ahead of its times and it was not until 20th-century
advancements in neurobiology that its value was accepted.62 To get out of the stale-
mate, the topic of (ab)normality was introduced. The supposedly normal person
could be punished in the traditional ways; by equating insanity with a lack of
accountability (and again in an either/or dichotomy) other remedies in the form of
measures could be introduced.
At the end of the 19th century, psychiatrists in the Netherlands became
involved as experts in the legislative process concerning the development of the
entrustment order as a legal figure.63 They heavily criticized the legal usage of such
terms as “intellectual powers” and “mental faculties.” To them, the legislator should
refrain from entering the scientific debate on the influence of the mind on the body
and its actions.64 As Robert Musil brilliantly voiced the problem in hisMan without
Qualities, set in 1913, what matters is “this ‘I’– the whole body, the soul, the will,
the central and entire person as legally distinguished from all others” and “Since a
person’s liability to punishment is the quality that elevates him to the status of a
moral being in the first place, it is understandable that the pillars of the law grimly
hang on to it.”65 So the clash of the empirical behavioral sciences and law on the
issue of the free will as found in the debate on the criminal liability of those who
lack the capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct or to con-
form to what the law requires posits the question of the (in)translatability of dis-
courses in interdisciplinary movements in law and other domains. Law’s
predisposition to seek retribution and deterrence by means of afflicting punishment
is in sharp contrast to psychiatry and psychology’s main aims to treat the patient
and restore his mental health. When in the setting of disciplinary cooperation the
ends, means, and methodologies differ, this cannot but lead to tension between the
disciplines involved. As a sitting judge, I encounter the problems of differences in
conceptual cultures in practice: those of crime statistics when compared with the
individual defendant, those of treatment versus punishment, those of economic
preferences versus the value of the rule of law in democratic societies, etc.
Scientific developments and new technologies also demand the legal profes-
sional’s continued attention to human rights and human dignity. To give just a few
examples, how are we to deal with (physical or mental) disabilities if biometric fea-
tures are used as reference for the identification of the legal norm which is “the
average person”?66 How are we to deal with the right not to incriminate oneself as
found in Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (fair trial) when unlawful intrusions in people’s lives
may be guarded, but bodily materials such as DNA, blood or urine samples, and fin-
gerprints are easily and lawfully taken from defendants, independent of the
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individual’s free will?67 What is more, both the technological decomposition and
commodification of the body into its separate parts,68 as well as technological
enhancements of the body via genetic engineering or xenotransplantation, force us
to rethink the legal fiction of the subject. The same goes for the issue of gender iden-
tity, or as the French first coined it, “sexe psychologique,” when we note that trans-
sexuality in France at least was classified as a mental illness until 2010, for it
recalls the 19th-century use of the concept of personality disease as discussed
above.69 This demands of the humanities as instruments of self-exploration to
reconsider their basic question after the nature of the human as both object and
subject of inquiry. For example, can new constructs such as clones (to date only
existing in the non-human animal form such as the sheep Dolly (mentioned in note
28) or cyborgs be endowed with rights that presume the capacity to bind oneself in
law and enter into obligations?70 And as George Annas rightly asks, “Can universal
human rights and democracy, grounded on human dignity, survive genetic engi-
neering?” and “If human rights and human dignity depend on our human nature,
can we change our ‘humanness’ without undermining our dignity and our rights?”71
New technologies result in the implosion of the legal subject as we knew it so
that the legal subject and the human, natural person, conceptually different though
they are, no longer necessarily coincide. We are used to speaking in legal terms
such as privacy, or civil and human rights, but this presupposes a persona that may
no longer exist in the same form as when these terms first developed.72 It also com-
plicates the old question concerning the very idea of human rights as rights that we
have simply because we are human, in contradistinction to legal personhood as a
construct that makes us a person before the law.
It would seem that the linguistic issue of the fiction as artificial or imaginary is
hard to do away with, and as Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner pointed out,
it is not at all easy “to understand how legal categories come into being and are
used,” because both typicality or commonness, similarity, and iconicity play a part
in the process.73 Our eradicable tendency to anthropomorphize is not helpful either,
though the legal paradigm of personhood obviously has long had its focus on mem-
bers of our own species.74 To give just one example from the field of psychology. In
his discussion of a grammatical investigation of “person” and “personhood,” Michael
Tissaw asks in which way categories and concepts can inform empirical theories on
the subject. He refers to Peter Strawson’s view that “it is easier to understand how
we can see each other, and ourselves, as persons, if we think first of the fact that we
act, and act on each other, and act in accordance with a common human nature,”
and addresses the source of philosophical confusion that “[W]e use ‘person’ in con-
nection with physical features and sometimes substitute it with ‘body’ […],” or, put
differently following Peter Hacker, “‘person’ is conceptually parasitic on ‘human
being.’”75 In the legal setting of the artificiality of the legal subject, this is very diffi-
cult to translate and thus such arguments are a source of interdisciplinary
confusion.
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But, to paraphrase the prosecutor in United States v. Amy discussed above,
“There they are.” From as-yet-imagined human look-alike clones of the film The
Invasion of the Body Snatchers to the creatures that people Atwood’s fictional world
of theMaddAddam trilogy (Oryx and Crake, 2003; The Year of the Flood, 2009; and
MaddAddam, 2013),76 and the computer as an object of love without a human body
in Spike Jonze’s recent film Her (2013), an object bought by the protagonist Theo-
dore Twombly on the basis of the advertisement “It’s not just an operating system,
it’s a consciousness,”77 on all fronts the question would seem that of personhood as
artificiality in relation to personhood and personality as authenticity. It should be
noted that Lawrence Solum already asked after the legal status of artificial intelli-
gence in the early 1990s, and that this is not at all unrealistic given the traditional
Kantian notion of personhood with its focus on reasoning skills and autonomy as
the criteria for assigning personhood.78
The point is even more acute today, both on the plane of law where the idea of
corporations as devices for the sole purpose of financial structuring, i.e., without a
persona component and people, is challenged by companies such as Google and
Facebook that proclaim to have a social “mission,”79 and by path-breaking techno-
logical developments such as digital representations of the human described as
“Digital-Me.” The latter is a technological device (for now, an imagined blueprint,
but with huge potential in the near future) that is a human person’s digital replica.
It can be programmed to perform that person’s tasks, thus serving as a kind of per-
sonal assistant. It can, for example, impersonate its owner when he or she does not
want to be disturbed. And when it does, it takes its owner’s decisions independently,
or rather, as if it were its owner. So the topic of the free will once more returns with
a vengeance. It also “knows” or “recognizes” situations in which it is necessary to
“switch on” the real Me. So the question whether it has “consciousness” comes to
the fore.80
“To Thine Own Self Be True?” The New Orlandos in Law and the Humanities
The examples mentioned above go to show that the original questions return, e.g., is
a human being a person, or is it a mind with a bodily extension? Will it remain a
material object per se or will it also develop a parallel a virtual–digital repre-
sentation? Or, when we think in terms of commodification, do we have, i.e., own our
bodies, or are we our bodies?81 The epistemological distinction between subject and
object is as eradicable as it is closely connected to the distinction between the legal
person and the (human, not so human) person as both body and identity. To date,
what counts in law is still the subject as an independent unit with rights and duties.
That is the fiction of legal construction that we all have agreed upon, at least so far.
But new technologies add to the fictions of the self in unprecedented ways, and,
with that, to the problem of human understanding of (legal) personhood as incorpo-
ration and embodiment has become a contested area. As Stephen Toulmin wrote,
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“Man knows, and he is also conscious that he knows,” and this makes epistemology
the area of interdisciplinary enquiry in the humanities, contrasting understanding
human action to explaining it, in conformity with the paradigms developed in the
natural sciences.82 So the question we have to ask is not only whether we dominate
technology or technology dominates us, but also, with the Cartesian dichotomy of
the mind as distinct from the body always hovering in the background, whether the
unitary concept of legal personhood should not be replaced by “To each his own
mask.”83
As far as our interdisciplinary cooperations are concerned, I would suggest that
following the legal principle of audi et alteram partem, hear the other side, law
needs the humanities in order to invite conceptual and methodological challenges.
There are good reasons for doing so. The legal and ethical focus for a definition of
personhood is still on sentience or cognitive traits (with or without the possession of
body parts, as in the case of corporations). At the same time, however, the assump-
tion remains that all human bodies that are capable of independent integrated func-
tioning as biological organisms are persons. This calls for more detailed attention to
such emphasis on organic (rather than legal or civic) independence as natural per-
sons remain looked upon through the prism of their being biological beings, on the
view that the legal tradition always reflects the normative elements of a culture.
What is more, the very idea of there being bodily characteristics (such as DNA)
independent of the volition of the person thus formed is under pressure by develop-
ments in genetic engineering. And the question where the “I” as opposed to “my”
brain is to be found is still undecided, although modern neuroscience has it other-
wise. Digital technologies can help construct identities, and that includes false iden-
tities. As the legal persona and the human person diverge, the point raised by Joel
Garreau is acute, “The law is based on the Enlightenment principle that we hold a
human nature in common. Increasingly, the question is whether this stills exists.”84
New technologies influence the construction of the human, literally and figura-
tively, since human thought too changes, as “we” became post-human as Katherine
Hayles already suggested that we did.85
This calls for methodological interdisciplinary attention to personhood and iden-
tity. To be a person in law, does one have to have subjective consciousness? Does
one have to be emotive or morally cognizant? Can a person only be a human being
as we think we know ourselves? Physically as well as metaphysically, a human per-
son still denotes a thing in the sense of an individual that occupies space and exists
for a period of time, with a certain amount of self-sufficiency, and a form of identity.
The latter in the sense of one’s experience of oneself as something distinctly unique
is characteristic of modernity,86 as Charles Taylor elaborated upon the Sources of
the Self. That ties in with the evolution from status to contract in law, for which
development legal personhood is crucial. John Finnis offers a methodological contri-
bution to our topic. He wrote, “Questions about identity are questions about what
some object of attention and inquiry is and whether it is the same as, or different
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from, another object of attention and inquiry,” i.e., the subject–object problem in
essence.87 To Finnis, the human person’s quidditas, i.e., “what-it-is includes being a
who-(s)he-is,”88 and he connects it to Aquinas’ (implicit) commentary on Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics that consists of four kinds of explanations of reality that are
“instantiated paradigmatically in the human person.”89 The first kind of order is
nature as existing independent of the person; the second order is that of human con-
sciousness,90 the third order is “that which is anticipated and shaped in deliber-
ation” and this includes “one’s personal identity both as self-determining and as
self-determined. […] What counts is what one becomes in choosing what one
chooses.”91 The fourth order is that of “culture, or mastery over materials (in the
broadest sense of material) – every kind of techne,” or what we would call technology
in the broad sense.92
With this in mind, I suggest that Paul Ricoeur’s distinction between one’s ipse
identity and one’s idem identity is of great methodological importance for persona
and identity as legal constructs. This distinction, made in Oneself as Another93 is
not only a contribution to moral philosophy on the subject of human relations, but
also is applied by Ricoeur to law and justice in The Just.94 What matters to me here,
however, given my interest in the field of law and literature, or more broadly, law
and the humanities, is his later elaboration on the plane of narrative, because as
Ricoeur claims in The Course of Recognition, the important thing for the human is
learning to “narrate oneself.”95 This, I suggest, opens up a possibility to connect the
legal persona to the contemporary “varieties” of identity that technology now
facilitates.
With the concept of idem Ricoeur points to the way in which the other perceives
me, for example, as a legal subject when the situation is legal, but also to the corre-
spondence between who we say we are and our bodily evidence or biological, genetic
codes in the form of DNA, fingerprints, physiognomy, voice, gait, as well as stable,
acquired habits, and the specific but accidental marks by which the individual per-
son is recognized (such as a scar, as in the example of Ulysses that Ricoeur gives).96
With ipse Ricoeur denotes the way one perceives oneself in the course of a lifetime’s
development, i.e., ipse as identity in the sense of human authenticity and unique-
ness. In the sense that ipseity is reflexive selfhood,97 a hermeneutics of selfhood is
required, connecting idem and ipse.
Such hermeneutics would include the following features, first, taking into
account the capacities to be found in the mode of the “I can” (i.e. the who), secondly,
“The object-side of experiences considered from the point of view of the capacities
employed” (i.e., the what and the how), and thirdly, “in order to give a reflexive
value to the self […] the dialectic between identity and otherness.”98
To Ricoeur, personal identity is tied to the act of narrating, both in the sense of
being able to narrate and being able to narrate oneself, “in the reflexive form of talk-
ing about oneself narratively [se raconter] this personal identity is projected as a
narrative identity.”99 This ties in with “law and narrative” approaches that focus on
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the individual’s ability to make him- or herself be heard in a court of law, or, as
James Boyd White consistently argues, the ability to tell one’s story and be
heard,100 on the view that success in law depends on being able to voice suffering,
wrongdoings, rights and their abuses, and so on. In the sense that the individual is
“him- or herself emplotted,”101 the problem of the temporal dimension of the self
throughout the individual’s life (and with it, its different ipseities, i.e., in the seven
ages of man, as Shakespeare has it) and of his or her actions can be solved if we con-
sider that “the personal identity, […] as enduring over time, can be defined as a nar-
rative identity, at the intersection of the coherence conferred by emplotment and
the discordance arising from the peripeteia within the narrated action.”102 The lat-
ter is obviously most acute in legal settings on the view that legal conflicts arise
when expectations about what should have happened are thwarted by realities. Put
differently, the “narrative identity” approach is a tool to bridge gaps between the
idem and ipse, for while the idem stands for the more immutable kind of identity,
its connection to the ipse’s changing identity throughout a life time takes place by
means of narrative, thus connecting (biological) sameness to selfhood.103
As a heuristic tool, it is eminently suited when dealing with topics in law as var-
ied as those who are unable to give informed consent because of their mental dis-
abilities (think also of the effects of dementia),104 to assigning personhood to
“engineered” or “enhanced” human beings (whether they can “narrate themselves”
or their lives need being narrated by others, an important task for advocates), and
to issues of privacy as well as other legal consequences of the distinction between
the private and the public realm, and, not to forget, the topic of law’s underlying ide-
ologies as noted in feminist legal studies and gay-legal or queer studies.105
In short, if a being is able to narrate its ipse identity more adequately, this can
enhance its possibilities to achieve fully if so desired the personhood of the idem
kind that is legal personhood, and, with that, the rights-and-duties-bearing conse-
quences. Or, if the attribution of legal personhood itself is not the main issue, the
“narrative identity” approach can help illustrate the everyday-life specifics of a
being’s ipse identity that color the circumstances of the case, for example, when in a
divorce case a dispute on rights along the conceptual lines of legal personhood only,
would lead to unjust results. After all, what matters for success in law is also
mutual recognition.
On the meta-level of theorizing, it urges us to take advantage of as many per-
spectives, or disciplinary narratives, as are available, not least for our mutual illu-
mination on the plane of concepts. To the literary theorist the terms “narrative” and
“story” are not interchangeable, whereas most psychological literature on the topic
does not problematize the distinction. The same goes, as noted above, for the use of
person(hood) between legal scholars and those working in the behavioral sciences
and the humanities. If the self’s narrative is culturally and contextually situated, so
are our disciplinary narratives. They suffer the consequences on the
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interdisciplinary level if they are inattentive to the conceptual and/or grand narra-
tives that guide and inform them.106
I started with an enigmatic picture. I end with another. That of the Baker of
Eekloo, a topos found in 17th-century Dutch and Flemish folktales and iconography
(Figure 2).
If one was not happy with one’s persona, one could go to the baker of Eekloo
where one’s head was then taken of and replaced by a newly baked one in order to
start a new life. There was, of course, a risk of failure and some ended up with more
than they bargained for, e.g., when they proved to be more hot-headed than asked
for. The moral of the story was that one should be satisfied with the identity one
has, the person that one is. To me, it offers a sobering thought in that it suggests
that there is only so much that can be done with legal personhood.
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Figure 2. Cornelis van Dalem and Jan van Wechelen, The Baker of Eeklo, 1530–73. Flanders. Amsterdam,
collection of the Rijksmuseum, currently on loan to the Muiderslot.
LAW & LITERATURE  VOLUME 28  NUMBER 3
308
1. The portrait goes by the name of “La Monacha,”
“Portrait of a Veiled Woman,” or “Portrait of a
Nun.” The caption is taken from Seneca’s De beneﬁ-
ciis, II, 17, as cited in Alessandro Cecchi and
Antonio Natali, L’ofﬁcina della maniera (Florence:
Marsilio, 1997), 123; and referenced in Liana de
Girolami Cheney and Sonia Michelotti Bonetti,
“Bronzino’s Pygmalion and Galatea: l’antica bella
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